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Economic Implications of the Peace Treaty
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON MARCH 27, 1979, following lengthy negotiations in which
President Carter played an important role, Prime Minister Begin of
Israel and President Sadat of Egypt signed a peace treaty in Washington,
D.C. It is the first treaty ever signed by Israel and an Arab state. The
agreement, while thus marking a historical event, is nevertheless opposed
by almost all of the other Arab states.1
In the years preceding the agreement, Egypt was faced with three
difficult options in its relations with Israel: to maintain the status quo, to
go to war in an attempt to liberate the occupied territories, or to attempt
to regain the territories through negotiations.
Maintaining the status quo had proven increasingly difficult and pre-
carious. For the forseeable future, it would have required Egypt to con-
tinue on a war footing. Egypt's serious social and economic problems
could hardly have permitted an indefinite continuation of a war economy.
Moreover, it is doubtful that military aid from Saudi Arabia would have
continued indefinitely if the status quo were to be maintained.
This first option suggested additional risks. The Israelis, for example,
had held the Sinai since the 1967 War. Maintaining the status quo en-
tailed the risk that the world would become gradually more accustomed
to the occupation and Israel would continue to develop and settle in the
territory. As a result, it would become increasingly difficult if not impossi-
ble to arrange for its eventual return.
Employing military force to recover the territories suggested an even
less appealing option than maintaining the status quo. Egypt's military
capability was no match for the Israeli army
Israel had built up an arsenal of sophisticated arms including nuclear
weapons, that beggared the Arab military potential. General Mohamed
Abdel Ghany Gamassy, Egypt's Minister of War and overall commander
of the armed forces, told Sadat that if war broke out, his army would be
* B.A. (1965), Hebrew University, M.B.A. (1967), University of California, Berkeley; M.
Sc. (1968); University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D. (1980), Golden Gate University. The
author is a professor at the School of Business and Economics at California State
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devastated. Because of Sadat's frosty relations with Moscow there was no
longer a Soviet supply link; Egyptian forces had slipped badly in relation
to the Israelis since the strike across the Suez in 1973.2
Egypt lost lives and territory in each of the four wars it fought with
Israel. Based on this bitter experience, Egyptian leaders could only have
been skeptical of the use of military force to recapture lost territory, in
view of the probability that even more territory would be lost in the event
of war.
Moreover, since 1973, the Egyptian economy had developed indus-
tries highly vulnerable to war, such as tourism and oil production. Many
new industries had sprung up in the Suez Canal region which would
clearly be endangered. In" short, it seems likely that Egyptian leaders per-
ceived renewed warfare as potentially devastating. In light of these con-
siderations, the third option-attempting to regain the territories through
negotiation-became the most appealing.
Israel also had to face some difficult decisions. It had two basic op-
tions: negotiate a peace treaty with Egypt or attempt to maintain the sta-
tus quo. The first option posed serious security risks. Signing a peace
treaty with Egypt would have meant and indeed, did mean returning all
of the Sinai peninsula, including civilian settlements and the airfields
which had served as the main bases of the Israeli air force, thus stripping
Israel of its strategic depth and rendering its borders less defensible. Fur-
thermore, the only Arab leader willing to consider peace was Sadat, a
sixty-year old statesman who could not have been expected to maintain
control indefinitely. Israeli leaders were undoubtedly worried that Sadat's
successor, with the Sinai under his control, might well decide to return to
the Arab camp and turn on Israel when the option of war next presented
itself.
However, there were also risks for Israel if a peace agreement were
not attained. First, had Israel passed up this opportunity to negotiate a
peace treaty with the only Arab leader who had expressed willingness to
do so, it would have been doubtful whether another such opportunity
would have arisen. Second, Israel would have eventually had to confront
mounting internal problems such as the pressure of public opinion. There
were signs that a growing number of people had become tired of the pro-
longed state of war and were ready to make sacrifices for the cause of
peace. Demonstrations attracted tens of thousands of Israelis who ac-
cused the government of not doing enough for peace.3 More importantly,
Israel's relations with the United States would have suffered. Absent the
TIME, Jan. 2, 1978, at 15.
' See 38 FACTS ON FILE, No. 1952, Apr. 7, 1978, at 235 and No. 1955, Apr. 28, 1978, at
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signing of a peace treaty, it was doubtful that generous U.S. aid to Israel
would have continued.4 In view of Israel's extraordinarily high rate of in-
flation and the burdensome taxation of its citizenry, it would have been
difficult for the Israeli economy to stabilize without aid. These considera-
tions suggest that Israel, like Egypt, had only one viable alternative, ne-
gotiation of a peace treaty. To summarize, both parties were drawn into
the peace agreement not primarily because of its merit, but because of
the lack of viable alternatives. These factors need to be considered when
assessing the costs and benefits of the peace treaty to both parties in the
sections which follow.
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE PEACE TREATY
A. Military Spending
The Peace Treaty provides: "The state of war between the parties
will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the
exchange of instruments of ratification of this treaty."5 Hence, indirectly,
one of the goals of the Peace Treaty is the reduction of military spending.
Egypt's defense budget for 1977 alone approached $3 billion (twenty-four
percent of GNP),6 a figure which constituted a heavy burden on the im-
poverished Egyptian economy. The actual cost to the nation may have
been even higher if one takes into account the great deal of talent being
channeled into the armed forces and away from other sectors of the econ-
omy. Thus, the Peace Treaty with Israel should enable Egypt to reduce
the defense burden and divert scarce resources to civilian sectors. Admit-
tedly, this is a gradual process, the effects of which will not be felt for
years to come.
Even with the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel,
however, it is doubtful that Egypt can get by without a strong military.
Authoritarian regimes usually rely on a strong standing army for internal
policing purposes. In addition, the fact that Sadat's regime has been
threatened by most of the other Arab leaders (see discussion infra) in-
creases Egypt's dependence on its military for security purposes. Egypt is
particularly concerned about its Libyan neighbor and about Soviet activi-
ties in the area.7 Consequently, part of the aid Egypt will receive from the
United States as a result of this Treaty ($2 billion) is earmarked for the
military.8
4 J. Aviel, Effect of World Food and Fuel Crisis on Israeli Policy-Making, 31 W. POLIT-
1CAL Q. 330 (1978).
5 Treaty of Peace, Mar. 30, 1979, Egypt-Israel, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 79 DFP'T STATE
BULL. (May 1979), 39 FACTS ON FILE No. 2003, §1, at 223 [hereinafter cited as Peace
Treaty].
6 INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD., THE MILITARY BALANCE 1978-1979, 36 (1979).
7 TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 56.
8 N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
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Neither can Israel be expected to cut its forces significantly since it
still faces a military threat from the unified Jordanian and Syrian com-
mand (the "Eastern Front") and from Palestinian forces in Lebanon.'
Moreover, the United States has approved sizable weapons sales to both
Israel and Egypt.10 Thus a significant cut in military spending is not ex-
pected in the near future.
B. Resources
The Peace Treaty provides:
Israel will witharaw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai
behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Pales-
tine as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will re-
sume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.11
Israel's discovery and development of extensive oil fields in the Sinai,
which is to be returned to Egyptian control under the Treaty, will yield
Egypt sizable economic benefits. As a result Egypt will become a self-
sufficient oil producer, thus limiting the impact of the Arab oil embargo
on Egypt.12 Egypt will also benefit by the acquisition of settlements and
tourist facilities developed by Israel in the Sinai. Finally, while Israel
must withdraw from important airfields and rebuild new fields in the
Negev, Egypt will be able to utilize these airfields for commercial
purposes. s
The Israelis, in turn, will suffer sizable economic losses, which are
especially severe in light of the fact that Iran has joined with Arab
oil producers in embargoing oil to Israel.14 To protect Israel against an
increased dependence on foreign oil sources, the United States and
Israel completed a Memorandum of Agreement on Oil.1 5 It provides for
an oil supply arrangement which is to extend ten years beyond the five
years provided for in the previous September 1, 1975 arrangement which
accompanied the initial Sinai withdrawal. 0 However, the agreement re-
quires that Israel reimburse the United States for the costs incurred in
I The combined forces on the Eastern Front exceed 1,000 aircraft and 5,000 tanks. See
INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD., supra note 6, at 37.
10 Time, Apr. 2, 1978, at 28.
1' Peace Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1, § 2.
12 See [1978] EUR. Y. B. 315 for statistical survey of Egypt's past import and export
figures on crude petroleum, reprinted in Appendix, Table 2.
13 Peace Treaty, supra note 5, Annex I, art. 6.
14 DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRs, at 87 (DMS, Inc., Greenwich, Conn.) (a copy of
this publication is on file in the office of the Case W. Res. J. of Int'l L.).
15 Memorandum of Agreement on Oil, Mar. 30, 1979, United States-Israel, T.I-S.
No. 9523, reprinted in 39 FAcTs ON FILE No. 2003, at 227.
16 Id.
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providing oil to Israel.17
The total cost to Israel of withdrawing from the Sinai was estimated
by Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman at $3.5 to $4 billion.18 How-
ever, this estimate does not take into account the inflation which is likely
to result. "A number of leading economists have predicted that Israel's
extreme inflation rate, already about 50 percent a year, will soar because
of the peace treaty."'19 In addition, the already severe housing shortage is
expected to worsen as construction resources are shifted to the Negev to
meet the needs of military forces being withdrawn from the Sinai.2 0 In
short, the withdrawl constitutes not only a security risk for Israel, but
also threatens Israel with economic losses.
C. Normalization of Relations
The Peace Treaty provides that:
The parties agree that the normal relationship established between
them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural re-
lations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to
the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual
enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. ,
As a result of the Peace Treaty, Israel will be recognized by an Arab
state for the first time. The two nations also agreed to exchange ambassa-
dors immediately following completion of the first stage of withdrawal.
According to the Treaty, this is to occur within nine months from the
date the instruments of ratification are exchanged.22
Egypt, however, may expect continuing adverse reactions to its peace
initiative from its Arab neighbors. Although Egypt had in the past main-
tained strong economic, political, diplomatic and cultural ties with the
rest of the Arab world, many of these ties have bben weakened or broken
as a result of the peace overtures initiated by Sadat. Relations with Alge-
ria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and Syria were severed in December 1977
after these countries sought to form a united front to fight Egypt's peace
policy. 23 On April 7, 1979, Sadat announced the recall of ambassadors
from Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates after they withdrew their ambassadors from
27 Id.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
' N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, § 1, at 9, col. 1. However, national news broadcasts during
October, 1979, reflected that, the inflation rate has esclated to 100%.
20 Id.
:I Peace Treaty, supra note 5, art. 3, §3.
2 Id. Annex I, art. 1, § 3A.
23 N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
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Cairo.2" Relations with Jordan had been similarly broken earlier.25
Egypt became even more isolated from the Arab world after the sign-
ing of the Peace Treaty. Iraq, for example, invited all the Arab states to
discuss sanctions against Egypt following ratification of the Treaty.2 Af-
ter an initial split between the moderates and the extremists, all attend-
ing parties agreed to recall their respective ambassadors from Egypt, to
transfer the Arab League headquarters to Tunis, and to impose a total
economic boycott.2 7 The move was to include "an end to all Arab
financial and economics aid, trade and oil supplies, and a boycott of any
Egyptian business concern that deals with Israel. '28
It is still too early to predict the full impact of these sanctions. First,
Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Ghali has stated that only unanimous
decisions under the Arab League Charter are binding.29 Significantly, the
Sudan and Oman allied themselves with Egypt and refused to attend the
Baghdad meeting.30 Second, the Charter expressly prohibits interference
in the internal affairs of member nations.31 Moreover, if attempts are
made to implement the boycott, Egypt might retaliate by seizing Arab
holdings or barring Arab shipping through the Suez canal.32 In retaliation
against the decision to transfer the Arab League headquarters, the Cen-
tral Bank of Egypt has already instructed local banks "to honor only
those powers of attorney on Arab League bank accounts that existed
before the Baghdad meeting."33 This was done "ostensibly to guarantee
the payment of salaries and severance pay to about 600 Arab League em-
ployees in Cairo." 4 The Arab League will, however, encounter difficulties
in its move since the $5 million earmarked at Baghdad to transfer the
League to Tunis was to be paid from Arab League assets.35 Moreover an
estimated seventy percent, of the League's employees are Egyptian and
they have been encouraged to refuse to leave.36 In addition, the govern-
ment has ordered the impounding of all archives and papers if an attempt
is made to remove them from the Cairo secretariat. 7 In short, "Egypt
24 N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 5. However, those diplomats below the rank
of ambassador were permitted to stay on.
25 Id.
28 N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
27 Id.
28 Id.
2, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1979, §. 1, at 1, col. 5.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
33 N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 5
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
Vol. 12:57
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY
seems determined not to give the Arabs anything to move," or at least to
make the removal so costly and impractical as to render it a most unat-
tractive option. 8
The significance of these and other events is the indication that
Egypt is apparently prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to obtain
peace with Israel despite earlier pronouncements that "Egypt would
rather forget the peace negotiations with Israel than be isolated from
other Arab countries."3' 9
D. Trade
Before the signing of the Peace Treaty, Egypt had close economic
ties with other Arab countries and did not engage in trade with Israel.40 It
was a member of the Arab Economic Unity Council and the Arab Com-
mon Market (ACM) since its founding in 1964.4 2 The ACM members
"have agreed in principle to remove all customs duties on agricultural,
animal, and natural resource commodities in trade among themselves.
They have removed, with a few exceptions, the tariffs on manufactured
products, creating in theory a free-trade area. 4 2 They retained, however,
"significant quantitative restrictions on trade in manufactured goods
through bilateral trade agreements which set target ceilings on the quan-
tity of goods that two-member states could exchange.
43
The next proposed step toward Arab economic unity is the creation
of a customs union during 1978-81, with the purpose of "eliminating all
trade barriers among an expanded membership while [retaining] a com-
mon external tariff toward non-member countries." Ultimately, the for-
mation of a "full payments union ... to act as a clearinghouse for trade
payments" is anticipated.45 Presently, however, Egypt finds itself increas-
ingly excluded from trade with other Arab states, and may well be barred
from participation in these ambitious programs.
Although peace will undoubtedly generate some trade between Egypt
and Israel, a look at both economies and the major export commodities of
each reveals that there is little they can offer each other. For thirty years
the two countries have been developing along independent lines. Israel's
markets were concentrated in, the developed and industrial countries of
38 Id.
" Statement made on CBS News Broadcast, Feb. 6, 1979, 9:00 AM (PT).
40 N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
41 U.S. DEP'T OF Comm., OvESsEAs Bus. REP., OBR No. 78-41, (Sept. 1978).
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Id.
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Western Europe and the United States. 46 Accordingly, Israel specialized
in expensive foods and consumer goods.47 Its major exports have con-
sisted of finished diamonds, edible fruits, textiles and fashion goods and
sophisticated electronic systems (see Table 1, infra, Appendix), products
which are either not imported by Egypt or for which Egypt does not ex-
hibit a substantial need (see Table 2, infra, Appendix). A look at the
composition of Egypt's imports reveals that there is little Egypt can buy
from Israel-primarily chemical products, machinery and electrical appa-
ratus, and iron and steel products-which Israel does not supply in large
quantity (see Table 1, infra). Similarly, Israel is not in great need of
Egypt's primary export commodities, which include raw cotton, cotton
yarn, potatoes and crude petroleum (see Table 2, infra). In the future,
some oil from the Sinai oil fields might be shipped to Israel. Conse-
quently, more trade diversion than trade creation can be expected for the
near future.48 In the long run, however, the creation of industries catering
to the new markets and the formation of joint ventures can be
anticipated.
Nonetheless, some internal changes are necessary before such devel-
opments can occur within Egypt. In the past, the centralized nature of
the Egyptian economy was an obstacle to freely-functioning private en-
terprise. All major firms were controlled by government holding compa-
nies which left little room for initiative by individual entrepreneurs at the
local level.49 As a partial response to this state of events, the 1975 Egyp-
tian Legislature passed Law III, which was designed to simplify some pro-
cedures and permit greater autonomy and flexibility at the plant level 50
Nonetheless, major issues such as investment and expansion, employment
and product pricing remain in the hands of the centralized government
bureaucrats 1For trade and joint ventures to develop, companies must be
allowed some freedom to adjust prices to rising cost, adjust the workforce
to market requirements and select investments based on projected rate of
returns.
E. Technical Cooperation
In the field of technical cooperation, Egypt stands to gain more from
the Treaty than Israel. Unlike other benefits, these gains can be felt in
the short run. For example, Israel has achieved considerable success in
41 This fact is clearly evidenced by examination of past issues of The Europa Year
Book. See EUR. Y.B., supra note 16.
17 FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 1978, at 38-39.
Is THE MIDDLE EAST, Dec. 1978, at 43.
49 See OVERSEAS Bus. REP., supra note 41, at 7.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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developing a modern and productive agriculture. Egypt, on the other
hand, has neglected this sector of its economy. Agriculture remains un-
derdeveloped and productivity remains low. Thus, there is great potential
for cooperation in this sector. Israeli experts could instruct Egyptian
farmers in new irrigation techniques, better crop selection and modern
cultivation methods, thereby increasing farm yields considerably as was
done by the Israelis in the West Bank.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that under a peace agreement signed
without the approval of other Arab countries, Egypt would allow such a
conspicuous Israeli presence. It is more likely that Egypt would prefer a
low Israeli profile. Judging from the tortuous path which the peace nego-
tiations have followed, it seems likely that without the support of other
Arab countries, Egypt will do little more than comply with the minimum
terms of the Camp David Agreements.
F. Employment
More than one million Egyptians are currently employed in various
Arab countries, sending home over $1.5 billion per year.52 Should Arab
dissatisfaction with the Peace Treaty result in the expulsion of these
workers, a hard blow would be dealt to the Egyptian economy. An impor-
tant source of foreign revenue would thereby be eliminated and one mil-.
lion Egyptians would be added to unemployment rolls. Such an expulsion
en masse might also create serious social and political consequences
within Egypt.
While there are many employment opportunites in Israel for both
skilled and unskilled workers, Israel is reluctant to import Egyptian
workers, primarily because of fear of "political and sociological ill ef-
fects. ' '53 Since Israel already relies heavily on Arab workers, it is unlikely
to increase this reliance on foreign labor.
G. Tourism
The Peace Treaty provides that: "Mutual unimpeded access to places
of religious and historical significance will be provided on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis." Egypt and Israel have considerable attractions to offer
the tourist, ranging from religious and historic sites to sun and beaches.
Tourism is already an important industry for both countries, bringing in
several hundred million dollars annually to each.5  Projected income for
82 Ahiram, Trends in Egypt's Economy, ECON. Q. 101 (Jerusalem, Apr., 1978).
3 See THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 48.
' Peace Treaty, supra note 5, Annex III, art. 4, § 2 at 226.
"5 IF PEACE COMEs-RISKS AND PROSPECTS 112 (A. Hareven ed. 1978).
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Egypt alone is $800 million.5" Moreover, tourism has a high value added
rate in that few imported commodities are necessary to run this industry.
Finally, tourism is a labor-intensive industry suitable for Egypt, a county
with an abundant supply of semi-skilled workers.
There is little doubt that peace will greatly enhance the tourist in-
dustry in both countries. Thousands of Israelis and Egyptians are proba-
bly eager to visit each other's country, as are Western Europeans and
Americans. Special package tours would undoubtedly be offered.
An increase in tourism is not without problems. Egypt's capacity to
receive additional tourists is limited; hotel rooms are in short supply and
already operate close to capacity.17 Building new hotels takes time and
requires foreign capital, which, as will be discussed later, may not be
readily forthcoming. Although Israel does have sufficient hotel accommo-
dations,58 successful package tours must include Egypt as well. Neverthe-
less, in the long run the potential benefits to the whole region from the
tourist industry could be substantial (see Table 3, infra, Appendix).
Table 3 is based on estimations of what could occur in the event that
peace becomes a reality. However, the Peace Treaty between Israel and
Egypt has been attended by continued terrorist activities. Since the tour-
ist industry is highly sensitive to political and military disturbances, even
a local incident or a commentary in the media about potential trouble can
cause thousands of trip cancellations. In short, continued terrorist activi-
ties pose a serious threat to any hopes of a flourishing tourist industry.
There are other signs that the growth of tourism may be slower than
anticipated. In Israel, for example, a committee headed by Eliahu Ben-
Elissar, former Director General of the Prime Minister's office and now
Ambassador to Egypt, has recommended that economic and travel links
with Egypt be built up gradually "to avoid offending sensibilities on ei-
ther side." 59 The committee suggested that during the first year, travel to
Egypt be limited to persons in their official capacities attending interna-
tional conferences, scientific meetings and other formal events.60 It was
further suggested that travel be limited to the air and that organized
tourism not begin until later.6 1 Thus, while Israel and Egypt quickly
51 See OVERSEAS Bus. REP., supra note 41, at 26.
11 A recent report by the U.S. Department of Commerce reads: "Hotel space in Cairo is
extremely difficult to obtain on short notice and sometimes reservations confirmed in the
U.S. are not honored." U.S. DmP'T OF COMM., OVERSEAs Bus. REP., OBR No. 78-20 at 9 (Jan.
1978).
8 Israel has twice as many hotel rooms as Egypt. ISRAELI BUREAU STATIMSTCS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL 460-71 (1977).
" N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1979, § 1 at 3, col. 4.
00 Id.
61 Id.
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agreed in principle to establish a civilian air link, large numbers of tour-
ists may not visit each other's countries until some future time as remains
to be determined. Meanwhile, although the Arab-Iranian boycott has not
been fully implemeted, Egypt may lose its profitable tourist trade with
other Arab countries.62
H. Foreign Investment
After signing the Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Begin spoke to a
group of American businessmen at a luncheon of the Israel-U.S. Busi-
ness Council and encouraged them to invest in both Israel and Egypt.6 3
President Sadat also planned to meet in Washington with influential U.S.
leaders "to push for U.S. acceptance of his $15 billion economic develop-
ment scheme, which he called "the Carter Plan."'" This plan is designed
to encourage American and European foreign investment in Egypt. Since
Egypt has a very low savings and investment rate, 5 it is forced to rely on
foreign investments to a large extent. In the past, foreign investments
were slow to come to this war-torn region. Peace, it is hoped, will begin to
attract more foreign funds.
However, the expectations of both Prime Minister Begin and Presi-
dent Sadat may be too high. Even in peacetime, Egypt would rank low on
the "investability index" of most major investors. This is mainly the re-
sult of fifteen year old government policies and practices designed to pro-
mote Arab Socialism. Under these policies, actions were taken by the
Egyptian government which were not attractive to foreign investors:
(a) Major sections of the economy were nationalized and placed under
centralized government control. The individual enterprise was stripped of
its planning and decision making powers and became hamstrung with
"red tape." Many entrepreneurs lost interest and initiative.66
(b) The Egyptian government assigned hiring quotes to plants and gov-
ernment agencies in an effort to reduce the unemployment problems.
Hence, unnecessary workers were hired,, thereby increasing costs and
complicating the bureaucratic processes. 7
(c) Through a complicated system of price controls and subsidies the
market mechanism was seriously impaired.68
62 To date this has not occurred. Boutros Ahali, Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, indicated at a recent new conference that the borders were still open between Egypt
and the other Arab countries. Id.
13 N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979 § 1, at 10, col. 1.
STnmE, Apr. 2, 1979, at 28.
66 Per capita GNP in 1977 was only $386. U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., OVmisA~S Bus. REP.,
OBR No. 78-47 at 6 (Oct., 1978).
66 See Ahiram, supra note 52.
67 Id.
68 Id.
1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
(d) Scarce foreign exchange was allocated by the government in a cum-
bersome and inefficient manner. Consequently, some industries still can-
not obtain a steady supply of raw materials and spare parts, and remain
idle part of the time. 9
As a result of these policies and practices, the infrastructure and basic
services in certain areas such as transportation and communications are
inadequate and underdeveloped by western standards. They may consti-
tute an additonal obstacle for the foreign investor.
Although Israel may become a more attractive place for investors
upon the establishment of peace, peace alone will not produce a substan-
tial influx of foreign capital. More basic societal and industrial problems
must first be resolved. Israel is a relatively small market (population 3.6
million).7 0 It is plagued by a high taxation rate and a shortage of labor.
Like Egypt, its economic development has been hindered by problems
with the government bureaucracy and restrictive labor practices.7 1 A fun-
damental and comprehensive reorganization of management and produc-
tion techniques and business practices is therefore a prerequisite to
proper economic stimulus and thus to the possibility of attracting signifi-
cant foreign investment.
I. Foreign Aid
After the signing of the Peace Treaty, the United States promised to
extend $3 billion in new aid to Israel."2 This promise includes $2.2 billion
in credits on favorable terms over the next three years and $800 million
in grants to help finance the removal of Israeli airfields in the Sinai.7 3
This is in addition to the $1.8 billion in military and economic aid that
Israel has been receiving annually from the United States.7 4
Egypt, in turn, is scheduled to receive $1.5 billion in new U.S. mili-
tary assistance and perhaps an extra $300 to $500 million in economic
aid.75 This is in addition to the $750 million in economic aid and $200
million in food aid recently received from the United States.7 6
However, Egypt stands to lose the $1.5 billion in aid which it has
been receiving annually from Saudi Arabia and the $500 million from Ku-
69 Id.
70 See THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 48.
"' Under these practices, for instance, it is hard and expensive for a company to lay off
unnecessary workers. Hence, underemployment exists in many sectors of the economy.
72 TIME, Apr. 2, 1979, at 28.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
78 See TIME, supra note 72.
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wait." It is quite possible that without this aid, Egypt's economy may be
placed in great difficulty and the political stability of its regime seriously
threatened. In an address to senior information officers, President Sadat
said:
In October 1973, the Egyptian economy was in a great bind. The availa-
bility of a slice of bread in 1974 was not on the horizon. I had debts to
liquidate in December according to world arrangements, but had no way
to liquate them. We did not have one penny in hard currency. This was
one of my considerations to go to war, since if 1974 came while we were
in such a difficult situation Israel would not have had to fire one shot.
You ought to know that there was no way to receive one dollar of Arab
aid-500 million-before inscribing with our blood the heroic crossing
of the canal. Within the first week after the October war our Arab broth-
ers sent us this aid.7 8
In an attempt to help alleviate Cairo's economic ailments in the past,
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had organized the Gulf Organization for the
Development of Egypt and provided the bulk of the $2 billion in capital
to Egypt."9 Most of this aid was applied to pay off Egypt's short term
debts.80 In view of the resolutions adopted at Baghdad on March 31, 1979
to retaliate against Egypt for signing the Peace Treaty,8 1 further aid from
this source may be discontinued. Arab sources have since indicated that
"Saudi Arabia would meet its existing commitments, including the pay-
ment of $525 million for American F-5 jets tp Egypt, but would not un-
dertake new obligations."8' 2 And while the Egyptian Minister for Foreign
Affairs stated in a news conference on April 28, 1979 that Egypt contin-
ues to receive economic assistance from Saudi Arabia, he declined to
specify the amount.83 In short, any benefits to be derived from a peace-
time economy will take time to inhere. Meanwhile, Egypt will be in need
of aid. If aid is not forthcoming from Arab or other sources, the Egyptian
economy could regress to a situation similar to that in October 1973.
J. Future Developments
The Peace Treaty provides:
Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is in-
tended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel
77 Id.; N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
78 See Ahiram, supra note 52.
79 N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
80 Id.
81 N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979 § 1, at 1, col. 3; TIME, Apr. 2, 1979, at 28.
:2 N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
3 N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
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but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is
prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis; 84
A lasting and legitimate peace in the Middle East can come only if
other Arab states join Egypt in its commitment towards this goal. Even if
they moderated their opposition to the Peace Treaty, Israel and Egypt
would gain substantial benefits. If Saudi Arabia alone were to do so,
Egypt could overcome some of its insecurity over loss of aid and other
economic sanctions and would be more inclined to fuller cooperation with
Israel. Furthermore, with Saudi Arabia committed to the peace process,
Jordan might be persuaded to join. With Jordan and Saudi Arabia joining
in the peace process, a number of substantial benefits could be foreseen.
First the risk of war would be further reduced. Without Jordan, the
Eastern Front would consist mainly of Syrian forces, and it is doubtful
that Syria would go to war alone against Israel. Consequently, further re-
ductions in military spending could be accomplished in Israel and Jordan
and more allocations for economic development could take place.
Second, with the likelihood of hostilities reduced, more tourists could
be expected to visit the area. The resumption of Saudi aid in the event of
regional stability would enable Egypt to construct new hotels at a faster
pace and to develop its infrastructure and basic services without having
to rely on foreign investment.
Third, large scale cooperative projects between the countries in the
region could be undertaken. The Tel-Aviv University has already estab-
lished a Research Project on Peace to foster research on the peace process
and regional cooperation. Israeli planners have discussed such projects as
building a massive hydroelectric complex in the Jordan Valley by making
use of the height differential between the Mediterranean and the Dead
Sea (about 1200 feet).8 5 Ultimately, joint projects could be conducted to
manage energy and water resources as well as to facilitate industrial de-
velopment.8 Transportation and telecommunications could be improved,
for example, by such projects as the Cairo-Lod-Beirut railroad and the
Cairo-Eilat-Amman highway. The resulting exchange of information
would benefit the environment, agriculture, and public health as well as
promote industrial development.
Unfortunately, the possibility that Saudi Arabia or Jordan will join
the peace talks is remote. The decision by the Saudi cabinet to break
8 Peace Treaty, supra note 5, Preamble.
* S. Hirsch, Towards Peace in the Middle East-How Can Business Contribute?,
Speech at Kiel University, West Germany, at 8-10 (J.C.B. Mohr, 1977).
8 See S. Gun, THE JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, A CHALLENGE FOR DEVELOPMENT 3 (Tel Aviv,
1975); S. Hirsch, supra note 85; Eisenberg, Planning for Regional Cooperation in the Mid-
dle East, THE MIDDLE EAST REv. 5 (Spring, 1979) (American Academic Assoc. for Peace in
the Middle East).
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relations with Egypt followed a marked hardening of Saudi Arabia's
mood as reflected by the tougher statements concerning the Peace Treaty
made by Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defense and Prince Abdulah, the
head of the Natioal Guard.87 Moreover, it is speculated that a power
struggle might be underway within the Saudi royal family with the pro-
American faction under Crown Prince Fahd losing ground.88
Until recently, Saudi Arabia has been pursuing a carefully balanced
policy of trying not to antagonize any party in the Arab world. For in-
stance, it provides aid to the Palestinians and to the conservative monar-
chy in Jordan. It maintains influence in most Arab capitals regardless of
their ideology or orientation. Joining the peace talks would indicate that
the Saudis had taken sides. This would not only anger and alienate such
radical regimes as Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and the Palestinians, but
might also result in serious military and security problems. Saudi Arabia
is no match for countries like Syria or Iraq. In addition, it has a large
Palestinian presence in the form of refugees employed in the oil fields
and in other positions, both managerial and blue collar. Thus, by joining
the peace talks, Saudi Arabia would be taking a considerable risk. More-
over, the immediate benefits in doing so are not yet clear.
As far as King Hussein of Jordan is concerned, there are also some
definite advantages in not presently joining the peace talks. Like Saudi
Arabia, Jordan must also worry about Syria, Iraq and the Palestinians. As
long as the United States and Egypt are already pursuing Jordan's inter-
ests by attempting to extract concessions from Israel on the West Bank
and in Jerusalem, it is wise for Hussein to delay submitting his own de-
mands pending the outcome of these efforts.
Furthermore, since Jordan's economy has been fairly strong and be-
came even stronger following the civil war in Lebanon during which many
businesses moved from Beirut to Amman, there is little incentive for Jor-
dan to join the peace talks now. The United States House of Representa-
tives tried to provide an incentive by amending a foreign military aid bill
to bar Jordan from receiving $121.3 million unless President Carter "de-
termines and certifies" that Jordan is acting in good faith in seeking
peace. 89 However, with so few friends in the Arab world, it is unlikely that
the Carter administration would risk a confrontation with Jordan.
Since the risks to both Jordan and Saudi Arabia in joining the peace
talks appear to outweigh the foreseeable benefits, it is likely that the iso-
lation of Egypt will continue.
'T N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
Id.
" N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
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III. CONCLUSION
The economic advantages to be derived from the Peace Treaty by
Israel and Egypt are negligible to both countries and are offset to a large
extent by the disadvantages. These disadvantages could have been mini-
mized had the negotiations and the final agreement been handled with
fewer formalities and less media exposure. The fanfare and publicity ac-
companying the negotiations alarmed the other Arab countries and pro-
voked a harsh reaction which stifled the potential gains from the Peace
Treaty. Furthermore, President Sadat, surprised by the intensity of these
reactions, hardened his own stand by increasing his demands on Israel to
prove that he is sensitive to the interests of other parties to the conflict
and is still the patron of the "Arab Cause."
In short, a more productive approach might have been a de facto
peace with minimum formalities and fanfare. Not only would this have
been more palatable to both countries and to President Sadat, but also to
the American taxpayer, who is now asked to compensate for the loss of
Saudi aid and for other economic hardship that is likely to be caused by
the reaction of other Arab states.
While the economic benefits of the Peace Treaty are negligible, war
and peace cannot be measured in economic terms alone. The loss of life,
human suffering, and the grief inflicted on thousands of families in a war
must be contemplated and added to the cost of a war option. Although
peace will not automatically solve Egypt's immediate problems of poverty
and overpopulation, neither will war. War could only aggravate these ex-
isting problems, while peace may initiate and catalyze a process of eco-
nomic recovery that, a least in the long run, will alleviate these problems.
While the peace agreement will not provide Israel with the peace and
security it wants, neither have the past wars. For Israel also, peace is at
least a start, carrying with it the possibility that better things will follow.
An old proverb of Benjamin Franklin's says that there was never a
good war or a bad peace. One can only hope that this peace agreement, in
spite of its limitations, will gradually develop into a full and mutually
benficial peace.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Israel-Commodity Compsition of Principal Imports and Exports"
('000 U.S. $)
IMPORTS
Diamonds, rough .............
Boilers, machinery and parts ...
Electrical machinery ..........
Iron and steel ...............
Vehicles .....................
Chemicals ...................
Crude oil ....................
Cereals ......................
Textiles and textile articles ....
Ships, boats, aircraft, etc ......
ExPoRTS
Diamonds, worked ............
Edible fruits .................
Textiles and textile articles ....
Fruit and vegetable products ...
Fertilizers ....................
Organic chemicals ............
Inorganic chemicals ...........
Iron and steel ................
Non-electric machinery ........
Electrical machinery ..........
1973
488,017
279,724
158,828
226,055
196,008
180,800
208,816
140,915
102,368
204,019
1973
617,109
127,854
142,838
73,399
34,191
25,744
16,315
33,734
30,293
27,082
1974
442,960
327,955
212,141
428,642
263,651
244,144
583,568
226,972
130,911
166,462
1974
641,131
137,528
160,234
88,654
67,246
59,287
36,473
51,685
46,887
42,704
1975
469,126
434,502
241,252
349,153
188,848
301,362
628,319
267,650
106,958
42,658
1975
640,744
200,797
164,748
77,905
72,263
67,904
45,428
98,604
54,571
78,112
TABLE 2
Egypt-Commodity Composition of Principal Imports and Exports"
(1E Millions)
£ E MILLION
IMPORTS
Cereals and Milling Products
Animal and Vegetable Oils ....
General Grocery ..............
Tobacco .....................
68.2 288.9
16.8 47.3
4.8 8.6
11.2 11.5
:0 See EUR. Y.B., supra note 16, at 594.
1 Id. at 315.
1976
670,252
403,501
182,722
253,970
194,760
282,515
675,516
235,854
119,690
53,250
1976
799,726
203,922
209,105
99,079
51,377
75,161
33,930
169,142
67,387
93,467
1975
286.6
135.2
16.0
20.7
1976
221.0
37.4
21.2
26.3
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Textiles and Textile Articles ...
Paper and Paper Products .....
Pottery and Glassware ........
Clocks, Watches, Scientific
Apparatus ...............
Mineral Products (excl. Crude
Petroleum) ...............
Chemical Products ............
Wood, Hides and Rubber ......
Machinery and Electrical
Apparatus ...............
Transport Equipment .........
Crude Petroleum .............
Iron and Steel ................
EXPORTS
Cotton, raw ..............
Cotton. yarn ..................
Cotton piece goods ............
R ice .........................
Potatoes .....................
O nions .......................
Edible fruits
Manganese and phosphates
Crude Petroleum .............
Benzine, kerosene and mazout
Cement ..................
16.9
11.8
3.6
4.1
7.2
53.6
24.9
51.7
35.9
3.6
25.3
1974
'000 LE
tons million
232 279.1
37 65.1
14 20.1
136 39.7
100 5.9
104 7.6
169 12.0
120 1.8
940 23.9
33 0.2
181 2.4
5.3 12.1
29.8
122.2
57.4
78.6
84.4
1.2
56.6
43.9
197.5
96.4
169.8
139.8
71.8
118.1
21.1
63.1
125.9
89.2
280.1
178.0
21.0
113.6
'000 LE '000 FE
tons million tons million
185 201.0 165 154.8
32 63.0 37 57.6
9 16.2 14 17.4
104 24.2 211 31.0
48 3.2 158 17.2
70 7.0 66 8.0
228 20.4 185 24.3
105 2.2 119 2.2
923 23.1 3,922 109.8
243 5.7 440 10.9
86 1.2 25 0.6
TABLE 3
Tourism in the area. Today and in time of peace. 2
Under present
conditions
Tourism from outside the area 2,500,000
Arab tourists in the area 2,500,000
Israeli tourists in the area 400,000
Average stay
Tourists from outside the area
Tourists in the area
Israeli tourists in the area
Total number of "overnights"
10 days
12 days
In
peace
3,300,000
3,500,000
1,500,000
18 days
8 days
5 days
"2 See Hareven, supra note 55.
Growth(%)
+32' ',
+40%
+225%
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Tourists from outside the area 38,000,000 59,000,000 +59%
Arab tourists in the area 25,000,000 28,000,000 +12%
Israeli tourists in the area 5,000,000 8,000,000 +60%
Total 68,000,000 95,000,000 +40%

